Introduction
As international agreements on bank governance have been negotiated and expanded since 1988, so the outcomes of bank governance have been examined in the literature, both in individual country and cross-country settings. A number of studies have focused on the prefinancial crisis and/or crisis periods, finding that well-regarded traditional corporate governance structures worked against good outcomes during the economic crisis. However, no published papers have examined the international bank governance experience in the postcrisis period. The literature has not previously analysed the response by banks to the crisis experience, in terms of governance, and how has it impacted their performance and risktaking in the post-crisis period. This paper addresses these issues, and examines bank risk governance, risk and return in the post-crisis period.
To strengthen banking operations and policies, in order that both banks and national economies can survive an event such as the recent financial crisis, many countries have introduced banking governance recommendations and requirements, following the Basel Accords of 1999, 2006 and 2010. The crisis experience has underscored the need for national reinforcement of current arrangements, and is reflected in rounds of revisions to the Basel Accord (BCBS 2006 (BCBS , 2010 .
Focusing on banks that did survive, the literature documents the perverse finding that better governed banks performed more poorly during the crisis, using traditional measures of good governance. It appears that what is considered to be good governance in other industries does not consistently enhance a banks' ability to respond to a financial crisis in a way that improves performance. For example, shareholder-controlled boards and ownership (Beltratti and Stultz, 2012) and greater institutional ownership and non-executive directors on the board (Erkens et al., 2012) are associated with poorer performance during the crisis. Indeed, the literature suggests that a focus on risk governance may deliver better performance in a crisis than a focus on shareholders' interests (Aebi et al., 2012) , implicitly questioning whether performance maximization is an appropriate goal for a bank. The evidence consistently points to the power of shareholders being associated with higher risk taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009) , whereas better performance is associated with having an independent board (Yeh et al., 2011) or having the CRO report to a powerful board, rather than to the CEO (Aebi et al., 2012) .
We estimate a measure of a bank's risk governance position, using the status of its Chief Risk Officer and the structure of its Risk Committee. We identify the factors that are associated with better risk governance, and determine which set of factors is more influential in the post-crisis period: bank operating factors, bank governance factors, national economic factors or national governance policy. Using this measure of bank risk governance, we assess the impact of better risk governance on bank risk-taking and bank performance in the postcrisis period. We find better bank performance is achieved from taking risks and managing those risks well: better risk governance is the missing link in the bank performance-risk puzzle. Post-crisis there is some evidence that the lessons of the crisis may not have been learned.
Underlying this study, and indeed this literature, are assumptions about how banks should be regulated. Options include the assumption of perfect markets in which competition for external capital will force banks to adopt best practice in all areas including governance, following Schleifer and Vishny, 1997. In this world view, regulation imposes unnecessary costs that may deliver non-optimal outcomes. The opposite view is Keynesian, in which government intervention in markets is necessary to ensure socially optimal outcomes. Under this approach, management cannot be trusted with power and specific and detailed governance regulation is necessary to limit their self-interested actions. We take a balanced approach between these two positions, assuming that neither markets nor governments are optimal regulators. Regulatory guidance will impact bank governance, which in turn will impact on banks' operating decisions and minimize bank failure. Any market intervention needs to be efficient and effective, and not subject to regulatory capture.
The contribution of this study to the literature is to examine the post-crisis period. Prior studies have examined periods up to and including the crisis. In our analyses of the period prior to as well as including and after the financial crisis, we further contribute by including national institutional, regulatory and governance variables. Our finding that bank performance is better when banks take risks and manage them well will be useful to bank regulators and bank managers around the world.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on which this study bases its analysis, and develops the research questions. Section 3 discusses the data collection and the data. The analysis and results for the determinants of a Risk Governance Index are presented in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, the risk and performance outcomes associated with the RGI are presented. Additional analyses in Section 7 compares these results to those of prior studies, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Theory Development
Several key prior studies have examined bank governance and its outcomes in recent years, with a smaller number of studies examining this issue internationally. The most comprehensive study on risk outcomes is by Laeven and Levine (2009) , although their data does not include the period of the financial crisis. The current study extends their work into the post-crisis period. Laeven and Levine examine whether bank risk is associated with ownership and/or national regulation in an international setting. They include the 10 largest financial institutions across a number of countries for which La Porta et al. (1998) assembled data on shareholder rights (excluding New Zealand because all its major banks are subsidiaries of Australian banks). They examine 279 banks across 48 countries between 1996 and 2001. They find that ownership structure determines risk taking: banks with more powerful owners tend to take greater risks. This confirms that shareholders prefer high risk compared to non-shareholding managers and debt-holders, and that powerful shareholders are able to induce managers to increase risk-taking.
Other prior studies comparing bank risk governance internationally have focused on performance in the financial crisis rather than risk as the governance outcome. Beltratti and Stultz (2012) examine the link between banks' corporate governance and financial performance during the credit crisis (2006 to 2008) for 164 large international banks. They find that better governed banks performed worse during the financial crisis, and conclude ironically that good governance rather than poor governance contributed to the crisis! They did not find that differences in banking regulations across countries impacted their performance during the crisis. Erkens et al. (2012) also look at the impact of corporate governance factors, particularly ownership, on financial performance of banks during the credit crisis (2007 to 2008). They examine 296 banks from 30 countries. They regress stock returns during the crisis on measures of corporate governance and control variables. Like Beltratti and Stultz, they find that banks with better governance had worse performance during the crisis. More institutional ownership is also associated with larger shareholder losses during the crisis. They find evidence supporting the explanation that more independent boards raised capital during the crisis to ensure capital adequacy, but the depressed stock prices resulted in a wealth transfer from shareholders to debt-holders during the crisis period.
1 Also like Beltratti and Stultz, they find that when country level control variables are included, they are not significant.
1 This is a reverse of the expected effect of shareholders increasing risk and transferring wealth to themselves through a put option on the assets of the bank. Yeh, Chung and Liu (2011) look at the 20 largest financial institutions in the G8 countries, exploring the link between independent directors and performance during the crisis period.
They find that independence of the risk committee and the auditing committee helps to improve crisis performance. Excessive risk taking improved performance prior to the crisis but the effect during the crisis was the opposite.
Two key papers have focused on U.S. banks, with one looking at performance as the outcome during the crisis (Aebi et al., 2012) , and the other (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) looking at risk as the outcome over a longer period.
Ellul and Yerramilli examine the relation between a Risk Management Index that they construct, and risk outcomes during the period 1995 to 2010. They seek to understand if a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is effective through the economic cycle. They focus on the U.S., and analyse data for 72 publicly listed bank holding companies of the 100 largest BHCs (bank holding companies) at end 2007, which represent 78% of total book value of assets of the US banking system. They find that banks that had higher risk in the previous crisis had worse RGI in the following period up to the next crisis. However, contrary to the international findings, banks with better RGI prior to the crisis have lower risk and better performance during the crisis period. The association of RGI with subsequent tail risk holds for the whole 1995 -2010 period, whereas its association with subsequent return on assets only holds for the crisis period. Aebi et al. (2012) pose a similar question to Ellul and Yerramilli, seeking to understand if having a CRO is associated with better bank performance in the U.S. during the financial crisis. The outcomes that they examine are both market and accounting returns during the crisis (2006 -2008) . They find that standard corporate governance has no impact on performance, whereas banks in which the CRO reports directly to the board have significantly higher stock returns, ROA and annual return during the crisis.
Finally, van Essen et al. (2013) examine the performance effects of bank and national governance factors in the pre-crisis and crisis periods using a large sample of banks across 26
European Union countries. They conclude that what works in a non-crisis environment does not always work during a crisis, and suggest that greater discretion should be available to bank executives as the external environment changes.
A number of these papers have focused on identifying the role of governance structures, looking for cross-sectional evidence of their impact. That evidence points to governance factors related to shareholder influence over decision-making, with worse performance associated with more powerful shareholder ownership structure (Laeven and Levine, 2009), shareholder controlled boards and ownership (Beltratti and Stultz, 2012) , and powerful boards plus powerful shareholders (Erkens et al., 2012) . Banks choosing more balanced risk governance policies, such as having the CRO reports to the board not the CEO, performed better during the crisis (Aebi et al., 2012) .
In summary, the literature contains some mixed results around bank risk taking and its effects in a crisis. Internationally, it is known that powerful shareholders encouraged higher risk because they benefit from the upside gains, at the expense of debt-holders and potentially tax-payers (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012) . It is also known that international banks with better risk governance experienced worse performance in the crisis (Beltratti and Stultz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012) , although this result does not hold in the U.S. (Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) . The different results in the U.S. compared to other countries may relate to the earlier strong presence of a Chief Risk Officer in that jurisdiction.
Finally, the literature examining the pre-crisis and crisis period does not find that national bank governance or other country level differences play a role. It is expected that national governance policy will play a more significant role in banks' risk governance in the post-crisis period, due to the focus of governments and regulators on enhanced bank governance regulation. The literature also points to the expectation that better risk governance will impact negatively on risk, and negatively on performance in the postcrisis period, compared to earlier periods.
The current study examines these questions using time-series data on banks' risk and annual buy-and-hold return, and their governance. It considers the impact of country level variables including governance and economic considerations as well as bank level variables including as operating factors and governance.
Data and variables

Sample Selection
To empirically test the three research questions, we collect data from 1999 to 2012 for the required variables. Our primary source of data is Boardex, which in 2006 includes 1741 banks, insurance companies, investment companies, life insurance companies, private equity, specialty and other finance firms. We focus on banks, and exclude those that are not covered by BoardEx, the database we use for board and executive characteristics. The sample selection, summarized in Table 1 , starts with 762 banks included in both Boardex and Bankscope, and then excludes non-listed banks. Setting size thresholds excludes more banks.
Although Beltratti and Stultz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012) set a threshold of Total Assets in excess of $US 10 billion, we chose a lower threshold of $US 5 billion which still reduces the sample to 197. Following Beltratti and Stultz (2012) , we require a bank to be a deposittaking and loan-making bank, because the regulation indices we use apply to these banks..
We then restrict the sample to banks with a deposit to assets ratio greater than 10% and a loan to assets ratio greater than 10% (again, following Beltratti and Stultz, 2012) , which reduces the sample to 163. Finally, following Erkens et al. (2012) In contrast to Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we do not include any compensation variables because of data availability issues across our international sample. National regulations tend to require the reporting of executive compensation only for the five highest paid executives.
In our sample CROs rarely appear among the five highest paid executives, thus compensation data for CROs is rare. Without such information it is impossible to assess CRO compensation relative to other key executives (such as the CEO), which can be used as a proxy for CRO status.
Our RGI is calculated each year using principal components analysis, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) . The first principal component of four risk governance measures is taken:
one relating to the CRO and three relating to the Risk Committee. Risk committee and CRO are defined broadly to include committees and roles that have the same purpose even if their naming is different, consistent with Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) , and Aebi et al. (2012) 2 . The risk governance variables we examine are likely to be positively correlated since they tend to be adopted together. Therefore, principal components analysis serves as a useful tool to aggregate different dimensions of risk governance, avoiding multi-collinearity issues that might emerge if each variable were to be included in a regression separately. In addition, the index so constructed can be used as an independent variable in regressions. Tetlock (2007) further argues that by using principal component analysis we avoid making a subjective judgment on the relative importance of single dimensions. In accordance with Ellul and
Yerramilli (2013) and Tetlock (2007), we perform the PCA method on a year-by-year basis to avoid any potential look-ahead bias that may arise if we use information from future years.
In our sample, the means of the single RGI components and the RGI itself are found to Committee Experience increased significantly throughout our sample period, reflecting both an increase in the number of risk committees in our sample firms and the increased presence of at least one non-executive member with prior industry experience in the financial sector. Table 3 reports the corresponding year-by-year statistics. This increase in risk governance could have been driven by changes in the regulatory environment for corporate governance and/or increased attention from rating agencies on risk governance. Alternatively the trend could have been internally driven as senior leaders themselves embraced the principles of enterprise risk governance as a means of improving business outcomes.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE (DISTRIBUTION OF RGI AND ITS COMPONENTS OVER THE SAMPLE PERIOD)
and Risk, and Risk Management Officer. For risk committee, we also included committees that include the words risk, credit, compliance and lending.
Measuring bank risk and performance
Our primary risk measure is Tail Risk. Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) , Tail Risk is defined as the "negative of the average return on the bank's stock over the 5 per cent worst return days for the bank's stock, in a given year". It is intended to capture the expected shortfall risk that is associated with excessive risk-taking and is particularly relevant for shareholders. We obtain stock price data from Thomson Reuter's Datastream.
Our primary measure of performance is a bank's Annual Return, which is the most popular performance measure in concurrent studies (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013 : Erkens, et al., 2012 : Beltratti & Stulz, 2012 . Annual Return is defined as buy-and-hold return over the calendar year using the total return index of a stock.
The 159 Committee Experience with a range of 0 to 1 and a mean of 0.13.
We report selected statistics from 
Determinants of RGI
The first research question concerns the factors that are associated with better risk governance in banks. Four categories of factors are considered: bank operating factors, bank governance factors, national economic factors and national governance policy.
The model to empirically test this research question is:
where subscript j denotes the bank, and subscript t denotes the year.
The first set of variables in this model, X 1j,t-1 represents bank financial characteristics. We have followed Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) (2012), who investigates the effects of national culture on firm risk-taking.
Broadly, he finds that the practice of risk-taking varies between countries. For internationally operating firms, the norms of their country of origin are the most reliable indicator of their approach. Mihet examined 50 000 firms in 400 industries across 51 countries, and found risk taking to be higher for domestic firms in countries with low uncertainty aversion, low tolerance for hierarchical relationships and high individualism. Domestic firms in such countries tend to take substantially more risk in industries including banking that are "more informationally opaque". Importantly, risk taking by foreign firms is best explained by the cultural norms of the country of origin. These cultural norms do not proxy for legal constraints, insurance safety nets or economic development.
We include two categories of national variables. The third set of variables in Model 1, X 3j,t-rule of law); Spamann (2010)'s Anti self-dealing index (a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders); Deposit insurance (used by Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2013) ; Overall Restrictions on Banking Activities (an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks 4 ); Private Monitoring Index (an index that measures the degree to which regulations empower, facilitate, and encourage the private sector to monitor banks); Official Supervisory Power (a measure of whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems);
Independence of Supervisory Authority-Overall (an index of the degree to which the supervisory authority (1) is independent within the government from political influence, (2) is protected by the legal system from the banking industry, and (3) is able to make decisions independently of political considerations).
The fourth set of variables in Model 1, X 4j,t-1 represents other country level economic variables, sourced from World Bank, including: Log of GDP per capita; and Industry concentration (the percentage of banking system assets held by the three largest banks). Table 4 reports the results of estimating RGI using Model (1) for the whole sample over the whole period of the study. We used year fixed effects, and in alternative regressions we exclude a country indicator, include a country categorical variable or include various country variables, and also exclude or include board independence. Board independence is arguably included in the dependent variables through Risk Committee Independence, but we note that Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) included it in their models. The results in columns 4 to 6 replicate those in columns 1 to 3. The exclusion of board independence as an explanatory variable has little impact on the results: in column 5, loans is not significant compared to column 2 result, and in column 6 CEO tenure is significant compared to column 3 result.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE (DETERMINANTS OF RGI)
In untabulated results, we also varied the explanatory variables in Model 1 by using alternative measures of size: size deciles and size squared. Our results are stronger when we measure size as a continuous logged variable, although the results are essentially similar.
The results in Table 4 enable Few of the country level institutional, regulatory and economic variables are significant in these regressions: institutional governance has a strong positive association with better risk governance, whereas GDP per capita has a weaker negative association.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE (DETERMINANTS OF RGI BY SUB PERIODS)
In order to focus on the risk governance response of banks to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, we also estimate RGI for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods separately, and also add an additional explanatory variable in the post-crisis model for the banks' tail risk during the crisis. These are reported in Table 5 .
In the pre-crisis period, compared to the whole period as reported in Table 4 , the results are comparable, with the following exceptions. First, institutional ownership is not significant in the pre-crisis period. Second, board independence is less consistently and less strongly significant. Third, variables measuring banks' leverage and loans are not significant when we control for country as a categorical variable, but a measure of Income Diversity is strongly positively significant. In particular, the ratio of bad loans is positively associated with risk governance in the pre-crisis period in one variation of the model. Fourth, ROA was weakly positively associated with better governance in the pre-crisis period, compared to weak negative association for the whole period. Thus in the pre-crisis period, we cannot distinguish banks with better risk governance on the basis of their internal governance measures, or as many of their balance sheet structure variables, compared to the whole period of this study.
In the post-crisis period, compared to the whole period as reported in Table 4 , there are more differences. First, Tier 1 capital ratio is positively significant in two of the variations of the model. Second, bad loans is now negatively significant across all of the model variations.
Third, ROA, deposits are not significant where they were previously. Fourth, only CEO tenure is significant, whereas previously all CEO variables were significant in some of the columns. Finally, two country institutional/regulatory variables are significant: deposit insurance with a negative co-efficient, and private sector monitoring with a positive coefficient.
The post-crisis results compared to the pre-crisis results and the results for the whole period highlight the changes in banks' risk governance. Tier 1 capital is associated with better risk governance. Bad loans were previously associated with better risk governance, whereas now it is associated with worse risk governance. Perhaps in the post-crisis period, bettergoverned banks have written off bad loans, whereas less well-governed banks have left them on the books. Differences in banks' leverage and loans are more important in distinguishing risk governance after the crisis. Board independence, institutional ownership and a regulatory environment that encourages private sector monitoring are positively associated with better risk governance after the crisis. Interestingly deposit insurance is negatively associated with better risk governance in the post-crisis period, implying that they may be substitutes.
When we control for high tail risk during the financial crisis, there is little difference in the results. The new variable is positively but weakly significant, but now prior period tail risk is not. Other significant variables are the same with similar co-efficients and levels of significance. Our results indicate that bank risk governance is not directly associated with poor risk events during the financial crisis, whereas it is associated with new factors since the crisis: banks' key financial variables (capital ratios and bad loans), the effects of banks' governance (institutional ownership and CEO tenure), and country regulatory and institutional framework (deposit insurance and private monitoring).
Risk Outcomes of Better Governance
The second research question concerns the impact of better risk governance on bank risktaking in the post-crisis period. We use the RGI as an explanatory variable in determining tail risk, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) .
The second model is
TRisk it = a + b 1 X 1j,t-1 + b 2 X 2j,t-1 + b 3 X 3j,t-1 + b 4 X 4j,t-1 + b 5 RGI j,t-1 (2) where subscript j denotes the bank, and subscript t denotes the year. The groups of variables X 1j,t-1 , X 2j,t-1 , X 3j,t-1 and X 4j,t-1 are defined as before and RGI j,t-1 is calculated using Model (1) as before. In untabulated results, we also used other risk measures such as EDF and equity volatility in analyses of risk outcomes, but the results were not consistent.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE (RESULTS FOR TAIL RISK)
We ran regressions of Model 2 for the whole period of this study, reported in Table 6 in Column 1, and for sub-periods of the pre-crisis period (2000-2006, reported When the same analysis is conducted over the two sub-period, pre-and post-crisis, the following changes can be observed in Columns 2 and 3. In the pre-crisis period only, size is negatively associated with tail risk (co-efficient=-0.001, p-value=0.098); whereas the following are not significant: deposits, loans, anti-self dealing and regulatory restrictions. In the pre-crisis period only, annual return is positively associated with tail risk (coefficient=0.006, p-value=0.060) and GDP per capita has a negative association (co-efficient=-0.004, p-value=0.057).
When lagged tail risk is excluded, the explanatory power of the regressions is somewhat impaired, as might be expected. Significant differences between the models including lagged tail risk (columns 1 to 3) and those excluding it (columns 4 to 6) are as follows. Annual return is now negatively significant overall (co-efficient=-0.015, p-value<0.001) and in the post-crisis period (co-efficient=-0.022, p-value<0.001), whereas previously it was positive in the pre-crisis period only. In the pre-crisis period, when lagged tail risk is excluded, the following variables are now significant: deposits (co-efficient=-0. Overall, we find that tail risk is slow to change over time, and associated economically with the proportions of loans, deposits and Tier 1 capital. This association with balance sheet variables is also evident in post crisis period with and without lagged tail risk, and in the precrisis period when tail risk is omitted. During the crisis, differences between banks' tail risk is associated with a broad range of banking operational and governance variables, as well as national governance, regulation and economic differences. In particular, we note that tail risk is negatively associated with lagged tail risk, return on assets and risk governance during the crisis only: when high risk would be expected to be negatively associated with returns. This is consistent with good risk governance having a negative impact on risk taking during a crisis.
In other sub-periods, neither variable is significant.
Recall that the second research question is to identify the impact of better risk governance on bank risk-taking in the post-crisis period. Our results indicate that risk governance is not a significant determinant of bank risk in the post-crisis period. Other significant dependent variables in the post-crisis period are lagged tail risk, annual return (in the absence of a lagged dependent variable), deposits, Tier 1 capital, loans, income diversity, CEO tenure/change (with and without a lagged dependent variable), anti-self dealing, and restrictions on banking activities. While the latter three variables are governance related, they do not measure risk governance at the bank level.
In summary, in the post-crisis period, annual return is a negative determinant of tail risk, but risk governance has no significant association. From the first research question, it was determined that tail risk is a positive determinant of risk governance in the post-crisis period but annual return has no significant association. So the connection between risk governance and tail risk is one-way: return determines risk, which determines governance, but governance does not determine risk. The remaining question to be addressed is, does governance determine annual return?
Performance Outcomes of Better Governance
The third research question is concerned with the impact of better risk governance on bank performance in the post-crisis period. Again, we use the RGI as an explanatory variable in determining tail risk and performance, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) , Beltratti and Stultz (2012) and Aebi et al. (2012) .
The third model is
Perf it = a + b 1 X 1j,t-1 + b 2 X 2j,t-1 + b 3 X 3j,t-1 + b 4 X 4j,t-1 + b 5 RGI j, t-1 + b 6 Crisis Year t + b 7 RGI j, t-1 xCrisis Year t + b 8 TailRisk j,t-xRGI j, t-1 (3) where subscript j denotes the bank, and subscript t denotes the year. Perf it is a measure of bank performance, measured as annual returns, X 1j,t-1 , X 2j,t-1 , X 3j,t-1 and X 4j,t-1 are defined as before, with the exception of excluding ROA from b 1 X 1j,t-1 , and RGI j,t-1 is calculated using
Model (1) as before. We introduce new explanatory variables, a categorical variable for crisis year, and interaction terms between RGI and crisis year, and between tail risk and risk governance, in order to understand whether the determinants of bank annual returns are different during the crisis period.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE (RESULTS FOR PERFORMANCE)
In Table 7 Columns 1 and 2, we report the results of regressions of Model 3 for the whole period of this study, including and excluding the crisis year variables (and including board independence, with country variables and year fixed-effects). We also report Model 3 regressions (excluding the crisis year variables) for the pre-crisis sub-period (2000-2006, reported in Column 3) and the post-crisis sub-period (2009-2012, reported in Column 4).
Finally, we estimate performance during the crisis (2007) (2008) , again without crisis year explanatory variables, reported in Column 5.
Most of the variables included in this model are statistically significant. We highlight those that are also economically significant. As reported in Column 1, two variables are positively associated with next period performance over the whole period of this study:
deposits (co-efficient=0.255, p-value=0.004) and income diversity (co-efficient=16.14, pvalue=0.003); and two variables are negatively associated with next period performance over the whole period of this study: loans (co-efficient=-0.349, p-value<0.001) and deposit insurance (co-efficient=-0.179, p-value=0.004 ). In addition, the crisis year dummy is significant, and the interaction between tail risk and risk governance is positive and economically significant (co-efficient=2.281, p-value=0.006 ). In the absence of either tail risk or risk governance being significant as individual variables, the significance of the interaction terms is interesting. Better performance by a bank is not achieved by taking risks without governance, or by imposing governance but not taking risks. It is risk-taking accompanied by good governance that delivers results in the banking industry.
In Column 2, when the crisis year variables are excluded, risk governance is negative and marginally significant (co-efficient=-0.092, p-value=0.094), so in a sense they are In contrast to the two periods either side of the crisis, as reported in Column 5, performance during the crisis is associated with almost all of the variables in the model. Although not economically large, the co-efficient for CEO duality is positive and significant (co-efficient=0.981, p-value<0.001), indicating that in a crisis, many factors lead to better performance.
These results indicate no impact from better risk governance on bank performance in the post-crisis period, either as a determinant on its own, or interacting with tail risk. However, over the whole period, the interaction term is strongly significant, indicating the importance of both risk taking and risk governance to good bank performance over the whole business cycle. Risk is good for bank shareholders when it is well-managed.
Further Analysis
We have undertaken sensitivity testing for some variables. We have included two period lags for tail risk as a determinant of performance, and used alternative risk measures of ROA per unit of equity volatility in all models. These sensitivity tests have not produced significant results and so are not reported.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper extends Ellul and Yerramilli's (2013) risk governance index for U.S. banks to 159 international banks across 33 countries, using that index to examine relations between national codes of governance, individual bank risk governance and both risk and performance outcome measures in periods before, during and after the financial crisis.
We find that banks with better governance are larger, have higher tail risk and a higher proportion of loans in their assets, and lower returns, lower short-term finance and a lower proportion of reported bad loans. They receive greater scrutiny from institutional investors, an independent board and experience greater CEO turnover, and do not have an entrenched CEO/Chair. Since the financial crisis, banks' risk governance is also positively associated with their capital ratios and private monitoring, and negatively associated with deposit insurance.
We examine the impact of risk governance on risk outcomes. Our results confirm the findings of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) regarding the impact of good risk governance in lowering risk during the crisis. During the crisis, it appears that banks were locked into positions regarding risk that were determined by their prior risk governance policies: risktaking during the crisis was related to prior risk, and prior risk governance. However, since the crisis period, in contrast to Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) , we find that risk governance policies have been less influential, and we find no relation between prior risk governance and risk. This indicates that internationally, banks may not have learned the lessons from the crisis about risk taking.
Our study also sheds light on the effects of banks' risk governance policies on performance. We confirm the results of Beltratti and Stultz (2012) , Erkens et al. (2012) and Yeh et al. (2011) that better governed banks performed more poorly during the financial crisis. However, because we examine a longer period, including the pre-and post-crisis sub-periods, we can contextualise this finding over the economic cycle. Better risk governance in fact has an overall positive impact on bank performance when it is combined with risktaking.
In conclusion, our contributions on the relations between risk and risk governance will be of interest to bank regulators and bank managers internationally. Risk determines risk governance throughout the period of our study, including the post-crisis period, but risk governance does not determine risk apart from during the crisis period. The effect of annual return on risk is not consistent, nor is risk or risk governance associated with annual return on a consistent basis. We find taking risks and managing them well is the best approach to improving bank performance over the economic cycle. 
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